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Summary –This paper describes the investigations performed by KIT in the frame of the German 
WASA-BOSS projected funded by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology to  improve 
severe accident codes and to analyse options to prevent or delay the failure of the main safety 
barriers e.g. reactor pressure vessel of PWR and BWR. The KIT contribution was focused on the 
study of the potential accident management to delay or prevent the failure of the reactor pressure 
vessel (RPV) of a BWR using ATHLET-CD.  For a generic BWR, different severe accident 
sequences without and with different SAM-measures were extensively investigated. The obtained 
results have shown that SAM-measures can be effective to mitigate the accident progression if they 
start before material relocation in the lower plenum. This paper will discuss the SAM-measures to 
avoid or delay the RPV-failure by performing reflooding of the core in certain time windows and 
under which conditions it will fail. The modelling issues, assumptions and results will be presented 
and discussed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Fukushima accident lead to a re-evaluation of severe accident management (SAM) 
measures for nuclear power plants worldwide. The German WASA-BOSS projected was initiated 
aiming at improvement of severe accident codes and the evaluation of severe accident measures 
for both PWR and BWR. Universities and research centres including KIT participated in this German 
project. The KIT-contribution was focused on the study of the potential accident management to 
delay or prevent the failure of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) of a BWR using ATHLET-CD. For 
this purpose, an accident scenario consisting in a small break of the steam line inside the 
containment and assuming the multiple failures of the safety systems was selected according to the 
PSA-analysis. Crucial for the RPV integrity, according to the analysis, is the coolability of a partly-
damaged core and the time of core reflooding as part of a SAM-measure due to the recovery of 
safety systems. The obtained results have shown that SAM-measures can be effective to mitigate 
the accident progression if they start before material relocation in the lower plenum. But the 
opposite is the case if the water injection is done when material relocation in the lower plenum is 
about to start or has already led to significant amount of corium formation. This paper will discuss 
the SAM-measures to avoid or delay the RPV-failure by performing reflooding of the core in certain 
time windows and under which conditions it will fail. The modelling issues, assumptions and results 
will be discussed and an outlook will be given. 
2. CODES, PLANT AND MODELS  
2.1. The ATHLET-CD simulation tool 
ATHLET (Analysis of Thermal-Hydraulics of Leaks and Transient) is a the German system 
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hydraulic response during normal and off-normal operating conditions. It has a highly modular 
structure in order to include a large spectrum of models and to offer a flexible basis for further 
development. In this frame, the simulation of in-vessel processes is carried out by different coupled 
modules which constitute the code version ATHLET-CD (Core Degradation). These modules allow 
the user to reproduce the core damage progression (ECORE module), the debris bed behaviour 
(MEWA), the lower plenum behaviour (AIDA or LHEAD) fission products and aerosol behaviour 
(FIPREM) during severe accidents, to calculate the source term for containment analyses, and to 
evaluate accident management measures (Austregesilo, et al., 2013). The core damage 
progression described by the ECORE module takes into account the mechanical fuel rod behaviour, 
oxidation of zirconium and boron carbide, melting of metallic and ceramic components, freezing, re-
melting and refreezing, formation and dissolution of blockages. The mechanical rod model consists 
in a simplified one-dimensional approach aimed at the calculation of the fuel and cladding 
deformation as a consequence of both thermal expansion and creep. Cladding creep velocity is 
computed by means of specific correlations which take into account  and  phase transition of 
Zircaloy cladding, as well as oxygen and hydrogen effects in order to estimate the amount of clad 
ballooning and the time-to-failure which is established by different criteria available in the code. The 
code is widely validated using experimental and plant data for LWR applications. 
  
2.2. Short description of the German BWR  
The generic BWR consists of 784 fuel assemblies with a thermal power of 3840 MW (Pointner, 
1984). Fuel assemblies contain between 80 and 96 fuel rods arranged, respectively, in a 9 x 9 or 10 
x 10 grid according to the different designs. The fuel rod claddings are made of Zircaloy with an 
outer diameter of 10.75 mm and are filled with uranium dioxide or MOX pellets over an active length 
of 3710 mm. The reactivity control is carried out by means of 193 cross-shaped control rods which 
are inserted from the core bottom. The containment has a cylindrical shaped structure made from 
pre-stressed concrete with steel liner. The pressure suppression pool located in the lower part and 
all the systems dealing with reactor coolant are included in the containment, allowing easy 
accessibility of most of the drywell areas. As for the safety-relevant systems, the most important 
features of the NPP are described as follows. The reactor scram system provides control rod 
injection at any reactor pressure by means of a nitrogen cushion and can also be diversely driven 
with an electric motor. The nuclear residual heat removal system (RHR) consists of three trains, 
having completely separated and independent process, electric, instrumentation and control 
redundancies (3 x 100%). The RHR system allows both high and low-pressure injections, and 
pressure suppression pool cooling in order to guarantee long-term core cooling at any reactor 
pressure. Moreover, an additional, independent residual heat removal system is implemented in this 
plant which works with a diverse heat sink by means of cooling towers and is equipped with a 
diverse emergency power diesel. The automatic pressure limitation system is able to handle 
undesirable pressure build-up in the reactor in case of isolation of the main steam line. The excess 
of steam produced by residual heat is discharged into the pressure suppression pool via eleven 
safety and relief valves (SRV) or three diverse pressure-relief valves. The reactor protection system 
monitors all safety-relevant data and on reaching limit values, it actuates reactor-protection signals 
that initiate automatic protective actions. The emergency-power system can supply the safety-
related components and systems in case of loss of main power by means of an automatic switch to 
the 110 kV stand-by supply or to the emergency diesels. 
 
2.3. Integral plant model of the German BWR 
The integral input deck of ATHLET developed for BWR plant to simulate the small break LOCA at 
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model provided by the GRS to the German WASA-BOSS project. As described in (Di Marcello et al., 
2014), the plant model was extensively modified in order to apply the ECORE module for the 
simulation of the core degradation behaviour and to improve the numerical stability during core 
degradation transients. The plant model simulates the thermal-hydraulic behaviour of the reactor 
pressure vessel, the feed water line and the steam line systems. In addition the emergency and 
residual heat removal systems, the boric acid control system, the reactor cleaning system, control 
rod drive cooling system, and the seal water pump are taken into account. The nodalization of the 
reactor pressure vessel and the steam supply system is shown in Figure 1. The primary loop 
thermal hydraulics behaviour is described by the following thermo-fluid objects: the downcomer 
represented by 4 TFOs (TFYD0nRR00 with n = 1 to 4) with the relative re-circulation pumps (only 
one is shown in the picture); the lower plenum (TFYD00UP01/02/03); 5 reactor core rings 
(TFYM0nKE00 with n = 0 to 4) with their respective bottom part (TFYM0nKEBO); the core inlet 
(TFYM00KEIN); the control rod guide assembly (TFYD00SS00); the core bypass (TFYD0nBY02 
with n = 0 to 4 and the inlet TFYD00BY01); the upper plenum (TFYD00OP00); the riser 
(TFYD00SR00); the separator (TFYD00SEI0/IN/ AU/A0/A1/01); the dryer (TFYD00TRIN/AU) and 
the steam dome (TFYD00SD01/02/03). The four main steam lines are simulated by means of the 
TFRAn1Z001 object (n = 1 to 4) whereas the turbine bypass lines are represented by the 
TFRAn3Z001 objects. The 11 SRVs are merged together and represented by the 4 valves in the 
objects TFTKn1Z211. The 3 pressure relief valves are simulated at the 2nd, 3rd and 4th steam lines 
by the objects TFTKn1Z001 (n = 2, 3, 4). The steam flow to the turbine, the turbine bypass and the 
auxiliary steam line supply to the feed water tank are determined in GCSM module and in the 
thermo-fluid system by the fill components specifically implemented. The feedwater system is also 
represented in the model consisting of the feedwater tank, the pre-heaters and the four feedwater 
lines. All the reactor main structures are considered for the analysis of the heat transfer and heat 
losses as well as all major reactor protection systems, reactor control systems, safety systems and 
auxiliary systems. As far as the ECORE implementation is concerned, the core is subdivided in 5 
concentric rings according to the thermal-hydraulics scheme. Each ring contains either 176 or 174 
fuel assemblies (FA) except for the central ring which has 84 FAs. The power radial distribution 
across the core is prescribed based on data obtained with neutronics calculations performed by 
means of TRACE-PARCS (Hartmann, 2016). The axial power distribution is assumed to be constant 
in time and uniform across the core rings. As far as the fuel assembly is concerned, the 9 x 9 
configuration is assumed in the present work. FAs consist of 80 fuel rods with one dummy rod filled 
with water. No distinction is made in ATHLET-CD between different fuel compositions, and all the 
rods are made of standard UO2 fuel. The 193 control rods are cross-shaped and are inserted from 
the bottom of the core via the control rod drive system between 4 fuel assemblies. Each arm of the 
external stainless steel sheath contains 18 absorber rods made of boron carbide (B4C) powders 
surrounded by a stainless steel cladding. As far as the lower plenum modelling is concerned, the 
new model LHEAD has been adopted in the present work, being more adequate for BWR 
conditions. LHEAD (Austregesilo, 2015) takes into account the heat conduction in the corium region 
(liquid melt and crust) derived from an enthalpy conservation equation in a two-dimensional 
calculation grid in cylindrical coordinates. The convective heat transfer within the liquid melt pool is 
taken into account by means of an additional heat conductivity term based on correlations for axial 
and radial Nusselt numbers. The most important advantage of LHEAD is that it is implemented 
within the ECORE module, thus allowing a full coupling with the thermal-hydraulics and the heat 
structures describing also BWR internals. Concerning the RPV failure criterion, the simple 
temperature model is adopted in the present analysis, which establishes the vessel failure when the 
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Figure 1 Vertical cut through the German BWR reactor building 
 
3. SELECTED SEVERE ACCIDENT SCENARIO 
 The definition of the reference scenario for the considered BWR plant is based on PSA 
carried out by GRS in 1993 (GRS, 1993). These studies have been reviewed in the frame of the 
WASA-BOSS project (Pohlner, et al., 2014) for the study of possible accident measures to mitigate 
the consequences of reactor accidents with severe core damage. In the GRS analyses, two 
different initiating events have a relevant probability to occur: the small break LOCA at the steam 
line inside the containment which is analysed and discussed in this paper; and the station blackout, 
which is investigated by other partners within the WASA-BOSS project. 
The reference scenario is characterized by a lower frequency of the so-called plant hazard state 
compared to the station blackout, but it leads to a very short time from the break opening to core 
uncovering according to the GRS analysis. This hazard state may only occur if a multiple failure of 
the safety systems is assumed. In particular, all the emergency core cooling injections including 
both high pressure (HP) and low pressure (LP) systems are assumed as not available as well as the 
additional heat removal system and all not safety classified and emergency means to feed the RPV. 
According to the event tree calculated by probabilistic safety analysis and described in (GRS, 1993), 
after the break opening, SCRAM is actuated by the reactor protection system and the automatic 
pressure control system is efficient to deal with RPV pressure variations. In the scenario, the failure 
of the HP injections is assumed at this point. These failures are not enough to lead the plant to any 
hazard state because RPV feeding can be still provided via the low pressure systems. To this 
purpose, RPV depressurization is automatically actuated to bring the pressure below 1.4 MPa. 
Nevertheless, the failure of all LP injection systems, of all not-safety-classified systems and 
emergency measures is assumed compromising the RPV feeding. These conditions lead to core 
uncovering and temperature escalation leading to melting of structural materials if no external action 
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operational in order to deal with the containment overpressure occurring as a consequence of the 
LOCA by being able to cool-down the suppression pool water inventory via the residual heat 
removal systems (RHR). To find out which is the most appropriate SAM-measures to prevent or 
delay the degradation of the RPV, the water injection in the core assuming that one of the low 
pressure emergency core cooling systems (max. feeding capacity is 600 kg/s) recovers its 
functionality at different degrees of core damage is investigated. In (Di Marcello, Imke, & Sanchez, 
2016), different reflooding cases were defined and investigated with ATHLET-CD:   
a) Case 1: water injection is actuated at 10 tons of molten material in the core (at 5500 s) 
representing a limited core damage state where partial control rods and Zr melting has 
occurred 
b) Case 2: water injection is actuated at 20 tons of molten material (6000 s). The core damage 
is extended to most of the control rods, canister and cladding material with significant core 
channel blockage  
c) Case 3: water injection is actuated at the onset of material relocation in the lower plenum (40 
tons of molten material). The core is in a severe damage state with partial fuel melting and 
most of the structural components relocated at the bottom of the core and  
d) Case 4: water injection is actuated at 70 tons of molten material. In this situation most of the 
core is molten and already relocated in the lower plenum with extensive fuel damage and 
formation of ceramic melt.  
The cold water used to reflood the degraded core is taken directly from the suppression pool 
assuming a temperature of around 40 °C. For these investigations, the ATHLET-CD integral model 
was extended to include the actions and systems needed to realize the SAM-measure mentioned 
above. With the extended integral plant model, the simulations with the different SAM-cases were 
performed. The main results will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
4. MAIN RESULTS OF SA-SEQUENCES WITH ACCIDENT 
MANAGEMENT MEASURES 
  
A summary of the main results for the studied cases are given in Table 1. Based on these results it 
can be stated that the SAM measure of water injection into damaged BWR-core is effective as 
accident mitigation only if the reflooding is initiated before or close to the onset of molten material 
relocation in the lower plenum. Consequently, no RPV-failure is predicted in Case 1 to 3 while for 
Case-4 a RPV-failure at around 10251 s is predicted. In Table 1, you can also see that if no 
reflooding at all is performed, the RPV will fail. On the other hand, we can observe that the core 
melting process is stopped by the injection of large amount of water leading to a water level 
increase and to significant temperature decrease within the core. The water injections will also 
influence the amount and dynamics of the clad oxidation and hydrogen production during accident 
progression under reflooding. This effect is more pronounced in the reflooding at 20 tons (Case 2) 
because the core temperature is much higher than that of Case 1. But for the Case 3 and 4, few 
additional hydrogen is produced as a consequence of water injection  since most of the cladding 



















Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Start of core melting 4856.5 s 4856.5 s 4856.5 s 4856.5 s 4856.5 s 
First occurrence of molten Zr 5180.8 s 5180.8 s 5180.8 s 5180.8 s 5180.8 s 
First occurrence of metallic melt 5597.9 s 5600.1 s 5597.9 s 5597.9 s 5597.9 s 
Start of melt relocation in the lower 
plenum 
6275.0 s - - 6275.0 s 6275.0 s 
First occurrence of ceramic melt 7165.9 s - - - 7165.9 s 
Vessel failure 10234.0 s - - - 10251.0 s 
 
In Figure 2, the predicted maximal core temperature, the hydrogen production and the masses of 
molten material in the core and lower plenum is shown. Due to the cold water injection, the core 
temperature is reduced to below 1000 °C in almost all cases except, Case 2. In this case, although 
the injected water can reach the core also from the bypass flow available thanks to canister box 
failure, the maximum core temperature remains at about 1700°C due to extended core channel 
blockages which prevents the cool-down of these regions. On the other hand, for the reflooding in 
Case 3 and 4, the material relocation in the lower plenum is favourable, because it allows removing 
part of the existing blockages of the core regions. For the Case 4, the injection of cold water in the 
core is not sufficient to prevent vessel failure although the progression of core degradation is 
mitigated leading to core temperature decrease. It is worth to mention that in this case, the 
reflooding is started when there is already a significant amount of corium relocated to the lower 
plenum. The lower head and the upper zones of the plenum are completely filled with melt 
preventing any possibility of temperature mitigation and leading to temperature increase of the 
vessel and ultimately to its failure. Detailed analysis of these sequences is given in (Di Marcello, 
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Figure 2: Predicted maximum core temperature and mass of hydrogen production (right side) as well 
as molten material relocated in the core and in the lower plenum. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
The investigations discussed in this paper are mainly focused on in-vessel phenomena that 
determine the RPV-integrity since an ATHLET-CD version without models for detailed ex-vessel and 
containment phenomena was used here. Despite of it, the results have demonstrated the capability 
of the code to simulate severe accident sequences including accident management measures such 
as reflooding of the core. The authors are aware about the uncertainties in the modelling of the 
complex in-vessel phenomena including the lower plena behaviour of the molten material and also 
about the accuracy and the validity of the results presented here. After Fukushima accident a re-
focus on severe accident research (modelling, experiments) is going on worldwide in order to solve 
open issues and to improve the modelling capability and accuracy of the codes. For example, some 
more work is needed to improve the description of the degradation of fuel rods, control rods, 
canister box and their interaction, the behaviour of the core support, the relocation of molten 
material in the lower plenum, etc. These topics will be tackled in the future considering newest 
experimental results that gradually contribute to an improvement of the current understanding of 
severe accident phenomena and their implementation in severe accident codes which are used to 
develop and optimize accident management measures. 
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